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With a simple mathematical model, we explored the antiterrorist effectiveness of airport passenger prescreening
systems. Supporters of these systems often emphasize the need to identify the most suspicious passengers, but
they ignore the point that such identification does little good unless dangerous items can actually be detected.
Critics often focus on terrorists' ability to probe the system and thereby thv^ a^rt it, but ignore the possibility that
the very act of probing can deter attempts at sabotage that would have succeeded. Using the model to make
some preliminary assessments about security policy, we find that an improved baseline level of screening for all
passengers might lower the likelihood of attack more than would improved profiling of high-risk passengers.
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While some aviation security measures are ap-plied equally to all passengers, others are con-
sidered so time consuming that they are restricted
to a fraction of air travelers. A prominent example
of a selective measure arises at the airport security
checkpoint, where some passengers are chosen for
more stringent secondary screening beyond the basic
screening all passengers undergo. The method for
choosing selectees has been changing over time, as
has its name: first CAPPS (Computer Assisted Pas-
senger Prescreening System), then CAPPS II, and now
Secure Flight. The Transportation Security Adminis-
tration (TSA) initially hoped to have Secure Flight in
place by 2005, but as of February 2006, this had not
yet occurred.
Opinions diverge regarding the antiterrorist effec-
tiveness of such passenger prescreening systems.
Then Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta
described a strong prescreening system as the "foun-
dation" of aviation security (O'Harrow 2002). Don-
ald Carty, former CEO of American Airlines, saw
it as "the right answer to security" and suggested
that such a system would not only foil actual ter-
rorist attempts but would deter terrorists from even
attempting an attack on aviation (Kageyama 2002,
Jones 2002). Others, however, have questioned the
protection offered by prescreening systems (Barnett
2004). One problem that has received special attention
is the ability of terrorist groups to reverse engineer
the system and thereby thwart it.
As Chakrabarti and Strauss (2002) argued, terror-
ist groups can find out through test flights which of
their members computers select for secondary screen-
ing and which they do not, a process the authors liken
to a carnival game. Then in actual missions, group
members classified as low risk could take the lead
roles. In consequence, the true effectiveness of the pre-
screening system might be far less than hypothesized.
Who is closer to the truth, the optimists or the pes-
simists? We formulated a simple mathematical model
of the prescreening process, one component of which
relates to terrorist behavior. The model clarifies the
tacit assumptions made by optimists, as well as those
made by skeptics, such as Chakrabarti and Strauss.
Moreover, the formulation makes transparent some
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potential problems with the argumerits they have
advanced. In some circumstances, for example, terror-
ists' ability to probe the screening system can actually
reduce the danger of a terrorist attack. Even if the
prescreening system is extremely good at identifying
high-risk individuals, it might only minimally reduce
the chance of successful terrorism if the screening they
undergo is inadequate.
System and Parameter Description
When a passenger checks in for a flight, the passen-
ger-screening system (PSS) labels her as either low or
high risk. If she is considered low risk and is also
not selected at random to receive additional scrutiny,
she passes through the metal detector and sends her
carry-on bags through the x-ray machine, a process
we call primary screening. Otherwise, she must pass
first through primary screening and then undergo a
more thorough search of her belongings and clothing.
We call the entire alternate process, including the ini-
tial primary screening, secondary screening.
We define the following parameters:
C: a priori probability that an actual terrorist is clas-
sified as high risk by the PSS.
r: proportion of passengers deemed low risk who
are selected at random for secondary screening.
PJ: conditional probability that primary screening
detects the terrorist's weapons and prevents her from
proceeding further, given that she undergoes only pri-
mary screening.
PJ. conditional probability that secondary screen-
ing detects the terrorist's weapons and prevents her
from proceeding further, given that she undergoes
secondary screening. Because secondary screening
includes primary screening, we assume that ipi^Vv
n: number of potential participants in a particular
terrorist plot.
T: terrorist group's deterrence threshold—the mini-
mum probability of success required by the group to
proceed with the attack.
For ease of exposition, we assume that a single ter-
rorist attempts an attack by trying to pass through
screening. (Two lone terrorists with plastic explosives
destroyed two Russian passenger planes in August
2004.) We treat the attack as successful if she makes it
through the screening system with her weapons and
boards the aircraft (Figure 1):
P(terrorist undergoes primary screening)
P(terrorist undergoes secondary screening)
= C-h(l-C)r .
Under these assumptions, a successful attack occurs
with probability
(1 - C)(l - r)(l - p,) + (C + (1 - C)r)(l - P2).
In calculating their chance of success, we assume
that the terrorists use accurate estimates for these
c+(i-cy
Not selected
for secondary
screening
Selected for
secondary
screening
KP>
Passes uncaught
through primary
screening
Is caught
Passes uncaught
through secondary
screening
Figure 1: The probability that a terrorist boards an aircraft witb weapons is given by a decision tree, if the terrorist
is not selected for secondary screening, sbe must pass uncaugbt througb the primary screening ievei. if sbe is
selected for secondary screening, then sbe must pass uncaught tfirougb the secondary screening ievei.
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parameter values. If their calculated chance of suc-
cess is smaller than T, they will forego their attack;
otherwise they will proceed. Low values of T reflect
willingness to attack despite a high risk of failure,
while high values indicate risk aversion (deterring
an on-board attack might only lead to mayhem else-
where, but that caveat can be applied to any success-
ful antiterrorist measure).
Opposing Viewpoints
People hold various views about whether the PSS can
substantially improve aviation security:
The "Right Answer" to Security
Supporters of profiling systems appear to assume
that the PSS will flag virtually all terrorists as high
risk, or that C is very close to 1. (TSA, for example,
has described passengers who undergo only primary
screening as "innocent" travelers who "clearly pose
no threat of terrorism." That wording implies that any
actual terrorist would get secondary screening.) Fur-
thermore, some people, including the Transportation
Security Administration (O'Harrow 2002), believe that
terrorists can be deterred by the prospect of strin-
gent searching (that is, they have a nonzero deter-
rence threshold, T). Under these assumptions, almost
all terrorists who would consider an attack on a plane
would undergo secondary screening, and the prob-
ability that they attempt and succeed at their attack
would be either l — p^ (if they attempt the attack) or
zero (if they are deterred).
Loopholes
Others believe, however, that profiling introduces
weaknesses to the security system. Barnett (2004)
questions the assumption that C would be very high,
citing, among other concerns, the difficulties in using
limited information about past terrorists to iden-
tify future terrorists and the possibility of terrorists
using innocent-seeming dupes who do not realize
that they are carrying deadly items. Chakrabarti and
Strauss (2002) go even further and argue that profil-
ing applied to passenger screening could actually help
terrorists improve their chances of success. Terrorist
groups can send members on trial flights, without the
intent to attack, to ascertain whom the PSS consid-
ers low risk. If we assume that passengers' PSS scores
are constant during the probe-and-attack cycle, then a
terrorist who passes unflagged even once through the
checkpoint knows for certain he has a low PSS score.
In the real attack, the group could use this low-risk
member knowing that he will face additional scrutiny
only if chosen at random.
Chakrabarti and Strauss argue that a terrorist group
can always find a low-risk group member. First, they
assume that n, the pool of terrorist probes, is arbitrar-
ily large. Second, they assume that C < 1 and that risk
ratings for different group members are independent:
even if five terrorists have been flagged by the PSS,
the probability that the sixth will be selected remains
C. The probing process is thus Bernoulli, and, if the
group keeps sending probes, eventually one will be
classified low risk. At the time of the attack, C would
be zero for such a known low-risk passenger, and
the probability that he would succeed would be (1 —
r)(l - Pl) -I- r(l - P2). While they do not discuss deter-
rence, they implicitly assume, using our notation, that
T < (1 — r)(l — Pl) + r(l — P2), so the terrorists will not
be deterred. Because the chance of undergoing sec-
ondary screening in this situation is simply r, they
infer that using a PSS would do no better than ran-
dom screening alone.
Discussion
These various arguments may be problematic:
Misplaced Optimism?
The optimists may rely on both wishful thinking and
incomplete thinking. First, they seem confident that
the profiling system will be highly capable in iden-
tifying terrorists (C ^^  1) but they do not say pre-
cisely why they are so reassured. Not all potentially
dangerous individuals appear on terrorist watch lists,
and data-mining algorithms meant to sort out sus-
picious behavior need not be especially successful.
At the time of the 2002 Washington sniper crisis,
historical data mining about serial killers led to the
widespread and false belief that the perpetrators were
white (Barnett 2004).
Furthermore, supporters of proflling are rarely
explicit about how effective they consider the screen-
ing imposed on selectees to be. Optimists appear
tacitly to assume that secondary screening is highly
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effective (P2 ^ !)• However, evidence for that view-
point is limited. Although several of the 9/11 ter-
rorists were subjected to additional scrutiny, not one
was stopped from boarding the aircraft. Secondary
screening at the time did not search for (let alone for-
bid) the box cutters that were apparently instrumental
to the plot.
Secondary screening today, of course, is more de-
manding than that on 9/11. But its effectiveness has
been sharply questioned. A 2004 report of the then
inspector general to the Department of Homeland
Security, Clark Kent Ervin, was not encouraging.
Undercover tests conducted in 2003 revealed weak-
nesses in employee training; screening equipment and
technology; security policy and procedures; and man-
agement and supervision (Offlce of Inspector Gen-
eral 2004). According to the report, the passenger-
screening process in place at 15 airports repeatedly
failed to detect weapons and explosive materials. The
main screening device is a metal detector, but as Rep-
resentative Peter DeFazio of the House Aviation Sub-
committee noted, "You're not going to find plastic
explosives with a metal detector, no matter how hard
you try." Representative John Mica, chairman of the
subcommittee, declared the results to be "bad enough"
for general screening and "absolutely horrendous"
with respect to detecting explosives (Hall 2004). For
certain types of plots, the true value of pj might be far
below one. In that circumstance, directing the terror-
ists to secondary screening might be a hollow victory.
The optimists also seem indifferent to pj, the detec-
tion rate for primary screening. But if C < 1, we cannot
ignore this parameter. Terrorists could use innocent
passengers in an attack without their knowledge or
find a low-risk terrorist through probing. Thus, if C is
low, any inadequacies of primary screening may sub-
stantially raise the chance of a successful attack.
Another point is virtually ignored by the optimists:
if PJ RS p2 = P> theri what value could profiling, or even
randomized selection, add? Regardless of whether the
common detection rate p is high or low, the PSS is
irrelevant. Only when p2 — Pi is fairly large does pro-
filing appreciably decrease the terrorists' success rate.
(Currently, secondary screening consists of the pri-
mary screening process plus additional steps that can
include a pat-down or wand search of the passenger
and a search of carry-on bags. The quantity p2 — Pi
can vary depending on the type of weapons involved,
where they are stored, and the nature of secondary
screening used.)
In short, the belief that prescreening systems would
identify virtually all terrorists (C ^ 1) has, to say
the least, not been demonstrated. Even if C were
close to one, that circumstance might be insufficient
to thwart terrorism. Because the optimists do not
consider directly quantities pj, p2, or p2 — pi, they
miss the point that identifying high-risk people is
beneficial only if that capability reduces the chance
that an attack would succeed. Even the deterrent
effects of effective screening—which optimists some-
times mention—depend on several parameters and
not just C.
Misplaced Pessimism?
Critics of prescreening systems may likewise be overly
pessimistic. They may be correct that C, p^, and p2
are far below one. But a germane question is whether
the terrorist's chance of being thwarted at the airport
is high enough to lead him to stay away. Given the
wide availability of easy targets on the ground, the
deterrence threshold T might be quite high, meaning
that terrorists would find a surprisingly broad range
of combinations of C, p^, and p2 unacceptable. That
range could include parameter values that can be (and
perhaps already are) achieved.
Moreover, Chakrabarti and Strauss's argument,
although interesting, might not be as damaging to
PSS as one might initially think. In some instances,
probing can actually reduce the chance that a ter-
rorist group will successfully attack an airplane.
Chakrabarti and Strauss argue that a terrorist group
can always find a low-proflle member to carry out
the attack. They assume an arbitrarily large group of
independent terrorists. But are the groups really arbi-
trarily large? The assumption that group members are
each classified independently as high or low risk sug-
gests that US intelligence services are unable to rec-
ognize connections between dangerous individuals.
This could be true, but models that assume this weak-
ness at the outset—and thus assume independence in
probabilistic calculations—could substantially overes-
timate the chance of finding a group member who
gets only primary screening. Perhaps most impor-
tant, however, is the point that terrorists might cancel
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their plans if they get evidence of an unacceptable
probability of success. Probing might provide that
evidence.
Consider a lone terrorist, and suppose that he has
made the following (accurate) estimates about the
system:
—Primary screening is 20 percent effective at
detecting his plot (p^  =0.20).
—Secondary screening is 85 percent effective at
detecting his plot (p2 = 0.85).
—No passengers are selected at random for addi-
tional screening (/- = 0). (This is only for simplicity.
Similar examples can be constructed with non zero
values of r.)
—The PSS has a 60 percent chance of selecting the
terrorist for secondary screening (C = 0.60).
Assume that the terrorist will not attack unless he
has at least a 25 percent chance of success (r = 0.25).
If he does not probe the system, he first com-
pares his estimated probability of success with T: With
60 percent probability, he would undergo secondary
screening and thus would have a 15 percent chance of
success. Otherwise, he would pass through primary
screening and have an 80 percent chance of success.
His total chance of success is then (0.60) * (0.15) +
(0.40) * (0.80) = 41 percent, which is larger than T. He
decides to attack, and as per his calculations, succeeds
with probability 41 percent.
However, if he does probe, he waits to decide
whether or not to attack until after the probing rim.
During this trial there are two possibilities:
(1) With 60 percent probability, he is selected for
secondary screening, knows he is classified as high
risk, and updates his estimate of C to 1. (Because
r = 0 in this example, he cannot attribute becoming
a selectee to bad luck.) Knowing that if he were to
attack, he would face secondary screening and suc-
ceed with only 15 percent probability, which is less
than T (25 percent), he gives up without attacking.
(2) With 40 percent probability, he avoids sec-
ondary screening during his trial run and knows for
certain that he is considered low risk (he updates
C to 0). If he were to attack, his probability of suc-
cess under primary screening would be 80 percent.
No probing:
15% chance of success
in high-level screening
80% chance of success
in low-level screening
41% chance of
success
Succeed
w.pr. 41%
Ilh probing:
0.6 Jr
0.4>k
Knows CAPPS
score high
Knows CAPPS
score low
Would have 15%
chance of success.
< t-»GIVE UP
Would have 80%
chance of success. Succeed
w.pr. 32%
Figure 2: We compare the terrorist's ciiance of success it he does not
prohe the system betore attacicing to that if he does prohe (p, = 0.2, p^  =
0.85, r = (},C = 0.6, and T = 0.25). The totai prohahiiity of a successfui
attacic is oniy 32 percent if the terrorist probes compared to 41 percent if
he does not. Thus, probing the system can sometimes discourage rather
than reassure the terrorist.
Because this is higher than his deterrence level T, he
decides to attack.
Because he attempts the attack only if he is deemed
low risk during the probing run, which happens with
40 percent probability, and would subsequently suc-
ceed with 80 percent probability, his overall chance of
success if he probes first is only 32 percent, which is
lower than if he had not probed (Figure 2).
What causes this outcome? Terrorists probe to gain
information about the system. If the information they
get is discouraging, then they might cancel an attack
that otherwise would have had an appreciable chance
of success. Unless one believes that terrorists can-
not be deterred—and their meticulous preparation
often suggests far more rationality than we would
Hke—analyses that treat deterrence as a negligible
phenomenon might be too pessimistic. (While we con-
sidered here only a single terrorist, similar examples
can be constructed for multiple terrorists.)
Some Explorations with the Model
As we have suggested, a simple model indicates prob-
lems with certain arguments about security screening
that have been advanced. But the model can also help
raise some general points about screening strategy,
even if tentatively.
We can rewrite the equations above to specify
that Q, the probability that a terrorist who actively
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attempts to board an airplane is foiled by airport secu-
rity, as follows:
where e = p2 — P\, and the other symbols are as
defined earlier.
Given that r is small (and is likely to stay so,
given the aversion to extra random screenings), we
can approximate the above relationship as
It is of interest to take the partial derivative of Q
with respect to each of its three components, which
reveals what would happen if we changed that com-
ponent slightly while holding the other two constant.
It is easy to imagine that p-^ could go up while C stays
constant; for p^ to increase while e remains the same,
however, pj would have to increase to the same extent
as PJ. This last circumstance could well arise because,
as noted, primary screening is included in secondary
screening, meaning that effectiveness gains in the for-
mer might often translate into equal gains in the latter.
Likewise, e could rise while p^ stays the same because
of improvements in those aspects of secondary screen-
ing that go beyond primary screening.
The partial derivative of Q with respect to pi is 1,
with respect to C is e, and with respect to £ is C.
Given that C and s are clearly below one, this out-
come means that a fixed increase in one of the param-
eters while the others stay constant is most beneficial
when it accrues to p^. Because everyone goes through
primary screening, it is a case of "a rising tide lifts all
boats." An example of a measure that would increase
Pl would be replacing the present metal detectors at
security checkpoints by others that are sensitive to
plastic explosives as well as metals.
One might think that, if it were possible to increase
two of the parameters {pi,C, e) by the same modest
amount while holding the third constant, one should
choose C and e, given their product would bene-
fit appreciably because both of its factors went up.
But for small changes in the parameters above, the
change AQ in the direct success rate of screening
would follow:
AQ % Api + CAe -|- eAC.
This formula implies that pi would always be among
the two parameters selected for improvement (again,
because C and e are below one). The other parameter
chosen would be the smaller of C and e. (Of course,
achieving gains might be easier for some parameters
than for others.)
There is also, however, a multiplier effect for any
improvement in Q, tied to the deterrence threshold, T.
If 1 - Q—the initial probability of terrorist success
given an attempt—exceeds T, but 1 — (Q + AQ) does
not, then no attempt will be made and the chance
of success drops to zero. This possibility means that
there is an extra effect associated with improving
checkpoint security, in which a small improvement
can sometimes go a long way.
Numerical Example
As we have emphasized, neither we nor anyone else
knows the key parameters in even a simple security
model. Here we make what might charitably be called
mildly educated cases to provide the basis of some
calculations.
The conditional probability C that a terrorist will
be selected for secondary screening was estimated to
be in the range 90 to 96 percent by Virta et al. (2003).
But on 9/11, only six of 19 hijackers were flagged
by CAPPS, for a success rate of 32 percent (Eggen
2002); three others were selected because of problem-
atic travel documents. Even 32 percent might be an
artificially high estimate because the 9/11 terrorists
had conducted trial runs and knew that secondary
screening, which was then weak at security check-
points, posed no threat to their plans. (Had they dis-
covered otherwise, they might have changed their
methods to reduce the likelihood of being selected.)
However, passenger profiling today might be more
accurate than it was on 9/11 given all the recent
efforts to improve it. All things considered, C = 50
percent seems a plausible first guess about the effec-
tiveness of identifying terrorists in the foreseeable
future.
We also do not know pi or pj terribly well. Reports
by the US Government Accountability Office suggest
that screeners are about 80 percent likely to detect cer-
tain unauthorized items, although it is unclear how
these discoveries are divided between primary and
secondary screerungs (Lipton 2005, Office of Inspector
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General 2005, General Accounting Office 2000, Gov-
ernment Accountability Office 2005). In any case, this
statistic applies only to some weapons, and signifi-
cantly, it does not consider plastic explosives. On the
other hand, new technology now being tested, such
as a walk-through "sniffer" that blows a puff of air on
the passenger to dislodge trace particles of explosives,
might tangibly improve weapon-detection rates. Any
estimates are speculative, but perhaps pi = 20 percent
and P2 = 50 percent are defensible choices (in which
case e = 30 percent).
The deterrence threshold T is the hardest parame-
ter to estimate, given that terrorists will hardly take
part in public surveys. Moreover, the threshold pre-
sumably varies from group to group. A Rand report
argued that fear of ignominious failure does weigh
heavily on terrorist groups, so it is unlikely that r is
close to zero (Davis and Jenkins 2002). At the same
time, many of these groups show too much sophisti-
cation to believe that success is guaranteed, so they
presumably do not insist on a T close to 100 percent.
A distribution for T seems more palatable than a point
estimate: Here we approximate T as uniformly dis-
tributed between 25 percent and 75 percent.
For C = 0.5, Pl = 0.2, e = 0.3, and r = 0, we find
from the equation above that Q = 0.35. To increase Q
by 0.05, we must achieve a combination of Ap ,^ AC,
and Ae that falls in the plane Ap^  -|- 0.3AC -|- 0.5A£ =
0.05. Among the qualifying points are (0.05, 0, 0) and
(0,0.083,0.05), reminding us that increases in pi have
greater leverage than the other quantities.
Of course, there is a chance that raising Q from
0.35 to 0.40 will push the terrorists' chance of success
from above T to below it. That will happen if T is
between 0.60 and 0.65; if T is assumed (i(0.25, 0.75),
the probability that r falls in the relevant range is
0.10. The overall probability of a successful attack
was originally (0.8) * (0.65) = 0.52, based on only
a 20 percent chance of deterrence at Q = 0.35. The
revised probability is (0.7) * (0.6) - 0.42, 10 percent-
age points lower. In this example, deterrence acts to
double the effect of a five percentage-point gain in the
conditional probability of thwarting an actual attempt
against a plane. We suspect that this outcome hints
at a broader truth: because of the possibility of deter-
rence, the total benefit of improved screening might
be considerably larger than the immediate benefit at
the security checkpoint.
Conclusions
As this simple mathematical model suggests, neither
side has made a persuasive case about the effec-
tiveness of airport passenger-profiling systems. Sup-
porters of such systems have focused mostly on the
ability of the algorithm to identify terrorists (C), an
ability they may well overestimate. They say little
about screening effectiveness of both low-risk pas-
sengers and selectees (pi and P2), yet these effective-
ness parameters are crucial to the overall success rate
of the system. Skeptics may have given insufficient
weight to deterrence (T), because of which, the selec-
tion and screening system might prevent attacks even
though it falls well short of perfect. Probing the sys-
tem, as we have seen, could sometimes prevent a ter-
rorist act rather than ensure its success.
The mathematical model offers some prelimi-
nary indications about improved checkpoint security.
Improving the baseline screening applied to all pas-
sengers by a fixed amount might be more beneficial
than improving either the terrorist detection probabil-
ity or the marginal benefit of secondary screening by
the same amount. Deterrence might appreciably mag-
nify the benefits of even modest gains in the chance
of thwarting a terrorist at the security checkpoint. Not
knowing the key parameters, however, we can hardly
offer these last thoughts as policy recommendations.
Straightforward mathematical reasoning can often
clarify the underlying reasoning behind qualitative
statements about aviation security and point out both
the limitations in such reasoning and the unknown
parameters it would be most useful to learn. Prob-
lems as important as those arising in Homeland Secu-
rity could benefit from a wider use of mathematical
modeling.
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